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A word of warning 
Ernest Mandel once said that Marxist writers too often echo Marx’s polemic 
without matching his nuance. The following paper is guilty of this. I have focused 
on empirical data, which I think will be of most interest to the reader. For reasons of 
space, this information is discussed within a bare-bones theoretical framework that 
is at times too simplistic to capture the full complexity of welfare-to-work policy. 
Nevertheless, I contend that they are solid bones, and were the analysis extended 
into more nuanced considerations, a significant amount of further empirical 
evidence could be presented to justify the thrust of the central thesis. Regarding the 
polemic tone of the paper, ‘workfare’ is no mere historical curiosity; it is a current, 
ongoing and expanding social policy affecting millions. It is my hope that this paper 
will encourage the reader to engage, react and feel moved to contribute to the debate 
surrounding this important economic phenomenon. 
Introduction 
Overview 
This paper explores the political and media use of labels applied to the welfare 
claiming unemployed in the UK between the mid-1970s and 2013. Utilising a 
Marxist socio-economic analysis, these labels are shown to have emerged primarily 
as responses to the UK’s gradual reorientation towards a low-wage, partially 
‘workfare-dependent’ service economy. Three distinct ideological periods— 
necessity, social exclusion and Broken Britain—are argued to have over-arched the 
gradual gestation of this economic formation, with propagandist continuums of 
deceit emerging in each phase in order to mask intensifying exploitation and control. 
Workfare 
Since the mid-1970s, the UK’s welfare system has steadily shifted from 
largely unconditional unemployment benefits towards what is generally termed 
‘workfare’. While workfare is a plastic and contested term, in the UK it has taken on 
the broad meaning of ‘reciprocity’—that is, making welfare claimants perform 
mandatory activities in return for their dole, thus ‘restoring fairness to the welfare 
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system’.1 Mandatory workfare activities vary, but generally include some 
combination of working for benefits, regular attendance at private workfare centres, 
re-training and attending case-worker interviews to provide proof of active ‘jobseeking’ 
activities. Workfare in the UK is currently administered by private 
companies on behalf of the government, usually under ‘black box’ agreements 
which permit individual workfare providers to design and implement their own 
regimes in order to fulfil payment-by-result contracts. 
The reserve army of labour and pauperism 
According to Marx,2 the fundamental source of capitalist profit is the general 
practice of paying wage-labourers less than the value which their work produces. 
Keeping wages down to a minimum is one of the primary means via which the 
exploitation of this ‘surplus labour’ is maximised. Fewer workers on the labour 
market thus means higher average wage prices and less surplus value extraction; 
hence, conversely, more unemployed workers on the labour market is good for 
individual employers as this exerts a downward pressure on wages. However, this 
situation is bad for capitalism generally as a lower average income may reduce the 
overall demand for goods—and this, as Mandel puts it, is the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of 
capitalism.3 In a related process, capitalism also exerts a systemic tendency towards 
the creation of a ‘reserve labour army’ of under, or unemployed, people, often due to 
continuing technological innovation and increases in productivity. (Capitalist 
regimes may also take active measures to increase the numbers of unemployed in 
order to drive down inflation.) The general functions of the reserve army of labour 
are: to undermine the value of labour-power and so enhance profit; to act as a 
disciplinary warning to those in work; and to function as a ‘Lazarus stratum’ who 
are raised from economic ‘death’ as and when businesses require them.4 The reserve 
army of labour, often surviving in the most desperate of circumstances, constitutes a 
continual testament to the irrationality, cynicism and human tragedy that underpins 
capitalist productivity. Defamatory labels thus emerge to poison public support for 
this group and to justify its continued punitive control. This helps to prevent the 
wider emergence of class-conscious awareness of the structural flaws of capitalism, 
and also, following capitalism’s periodic crises, to justify the driving back of 
paupers into super-exploited low-wage work in order to underpin a recovery.5 
The materialist theory of ideology 
According to Marxist theory, material factors, most significantly the specific 
historical configuration of economic organisation surrounding production, exert real 
pressures that drive economic elites to adopt ideologies which justify and mask the 
1 Iain Duncan SMITH, ‘Restoring Fairness to the Welfare System’, Conservatives.com, 2011, 
p. 1. 
2 Karl MARX, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 1887 [first English edition of 1887, 
published online by Marxists.org, 2010]. 
3 Ernest MANDEL, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, London: Pathfinder, 2011, 
p. 69. 
4 Karl MARX, op. cit., p. 445. 
5 Ernest MANDEL, Marxist Economic Theory, London: Merlin Press, 1971. 
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realities of class exploitation. Welfare claimant obloquy thus emerges because it is 
needed: defamatory labels are ideas, and their role is primarily reactive to changes in 
the economy, rather than being causes of changes. However, while labels may be 
obnoxious propaganda, for example ‘scrounger’ or ‘scum’, they may also be subtle 
misdirections, such as ‘training scheme participant’, or ‘the socially excluded’. 
Purpose matters more than form. 
The matriculation of labels into the ideological superstructure is explained by 
Gerry Cohen’s concept of ‘functionally selectivity’.6 Via functional selectivity—a 
process in some ways comparable to natural selection—ideas which most usefully 
service a contemporary phase of capitalist ideological requirements enjoy a much 
greater chance of being ‘selected’ up into the ideological architecture. This 
architecture may include the political, media and academic spheres, but ‘selected’ 
ideas may also in turn trickle down to become temporary phases of ‘common sense’ 
amongst sections of the general public. Labels are chosen, in other words, for their 
usefulness and subsequently disseminated by people who have a vested interest in 
masking the exploitative economic realities of capitalism. 
The workfare-dependent state, the world market and the lion’s rage 
By the 1970s, emergent globalisation, the seemingly unresolvable crises of 
stagflation stemming from the implosion of Keynesianism, and a significant 
diminution of capitalist profit and power7 prompted the formation of ideological 
apertures in the UK’s political architecture. The colonisation of these apertures 
(i.e. explicatory and policy voids) by neoliberalism,8 marked a significant proof of 
Cohen’s functional selectivity hypothesis: a previously marginal ultra-right-wing 
economic theory was rapidly drawn-up, via idealist capillary action, into active 
power and ideological legitimacy due to its usefulness in restoring power and profit 
to the elite.9 In other words, what precipitated the nascent neoliberal counterrevolution 
in the UK in the mid-1970s was not a change of ideological 
superstructure, but a shift in the material infrastructure. 
The economic territory governed by what might be cautiously labelled the 
‘neoliberal order’ is a vast world-market of interconnected regimes, businesses and 
workers. Within this global economy, as economist G. F. Ray puts it, ‘from the point 
of view of international competitiveness, it is total labour cost that counts’.10 As 
Jessop warns, however, the term ‘competitiveness’ places a positive spin on 
exploitation and should be treated with caution;11 properly interpreted, what Ray 
6 Gerald COHEN, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. 
7 Bob JESSOP, ‘Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post- 
Fordist Political Economy’, Studies in Political Economy, vol. 40, 1993; David HARVEY, A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
8 David HARVEY, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism, London: Profile 
Books, 2011; Kenneth HOOVER, Economics as Ideology: Keynes, Laski, Hayek, and the 
Creation of Contemporary Politics, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. 
9 David HARVEY, 2007, op. cit. 
10 G. F. RAY, ‘Industrial Labour Costs, 1971-1983’, National Institute Economic Review, 
vol. 110, n° 62, 1984, p. 64. 
11 Bob JESSOP, op. cit. 
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actually means is that lower wages are the basis of greater profits. By the 1970s the 
UK was already a low-wage economy compared to most other industrialised 
nations12—but this situation was changing, as ‘apart from Italy, wage costs rose the 
fastest in the UK to 1981’.13 
Two important elements of Marxist economic theory need to be outlined in 
order to make clear what happened next. Firstly, there are two primary ways a 
business can increase its profits: by improving the productivity of industrial 
manufacture (for example by utilising better machines), or by more deeply 
exploiting workers (for example by lowering their wages and/or intensifying their 
working day). Secondly, that crises tend to be overcome by employing the lowest 
paid workers, from whom the highest ratios of renewed exploitation can be 
extracted.14 This generally means the intensified exploitation of women, children, 
poor-law claimants, foreign workers and immigrants who, due to historically 
embedded chauvinism, can be paid the lowest wages. Which of these two courses 
the UK would take in the crisis of the late-1970s was conditioned by its pathdependency 
on one of the primary features of late capitalism: the significant deindustrialisation 
and concomitant increase of the tertiary, or ‘services’, sector in the 
major capitalist nations.15 This occurs for many reasons, one of which is cheaper 
foreign labour markets. Like most industrialised countries, the UK experienced this 
reorientation from the 1970s onwards.16 Short of genetic engineering, or a vast 
investment in education, people cannot be reinvented and so by definition drawing a 
greater ratio of profit from a service economy requires the deepening of exploitation 
through lower wages and more disciplined working conditions. One of the most 
important actions of the Thatcher government, elected in 1979, was to apply the 
ideological grease that lubricated this transition. As Thatcher put it: ‘[We should 
not] prop up yesterday’s industries, rather than encourage the creation of 
tomorrow’s’.17 The transition would occur, however, not through ‘encouragement’, 
but through the weakening of hard-won quasi-socialist safeguards embedded in the 
political, legal and economic architecture, allowing them to buckle, and eventually 
yield, to the extreme economic pressure pushing for the replacement of full-time, 
primarily male industrial labour with ‘flexible’ low-paid, significantly female, 
service work.18 
Seen via the Marxist lens, the obsessive neoliberal-era academic, media and 
political defamation of the poorest, most vulnerable units of society—i.e. poor, 
female-headed households, welfare claimants, immigrants, the disabled, and ‘feral’ 
youth—is thus revealed not as glib ignorance or simple nastiness, but as an 
ideological response to a material imperative: the wealth that supports the lifestyles 
12 G. F. RAY, op. cit. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ernest MANDEL, 1971, op. cit. 
15 Goran THERBORN, Why Some Peoples are More Unemployed than Others, London: 
Verso, 1986. 
16 Andrew CLARK & Richard LAYARD, UK Unemployment, Oxford: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1993. 
17 Margaret THATCHER, ‘Speech to Conservative Women’s Conference’, 1980, Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation, 2013, p. 3. 
18 Andre GORZ, Critique of Economic Reason, London: Verso, 1989. 
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of the neoliberal elite is fed by a continuum of exploitation underpinned by these 
groups. The elite feed upon them, and hate them as justification for the feeding. As 
Adorno puts it: ‘If the lion had a consciousness, his rage at the antelope he wants to 
eat would be ideology’.19 The progressive intensity of this ‘rage’ over the past forty 
years grew in direct proportion to increasingly desperate and ultimately pointless 
elite attempts to prevent capitalism’s Achilles’ heel from degenerating into a 
permanent neoliberal disability: a vicious economic stalemate in which the 
intensified exploitation of the most vulnerable is no longer a quasi-temporary phase 
initiated to stimulate a recovery, but a permanent ‘workfare state’.20 This economic 
vacuum draws ever greater sections of the population, employed and unemployed, 
legal and illegal, domestic and foreign, paid and unpaid, into a nightmare of poverty 
and servile work, recoded glibly as necessary ‘austerity’ and noble ‘hard-work’. 
Rage presaged 
To create the workfare-dependent state in the UK—and so harmonise its 
economy with more ‘competitive’ global conditions of production—a fundamental 
change in the socio-economic structure first had to be engineered viz a major rolling 
back of welfare state provision.21 This was essential because the welfare state 
protected the most vulnerable, and therefore valuable, social units from having to 
sell their labour-power as a commodity. In 1974, key architect of Thatcherism Keith 
Joseph made an early, ham-fisted attempt to win support for this brutal recommodification 
by declaring that welfare funded, unmarried mothers from poor 
estates were ‘producing problem children, the future unmarried mothers, 
delinquents, denizens of our borstals, sub-normal educational establishments, 
prisons, hostels for drifters’.22 Such language would, decades later, be so 
ideologically ingrained in national discourse that even calls for the poor to be put 
into concentration camps (now re-styled as ‘boot-camps’),23 or sterilised,24 could be 
reported glibly in mainstream media. But in 1974 it was a career-damaging gaffe: 
the power of organised labour was still far too influential to permit such a naked 
attempt at economically motivated class-racism. It would require time, and an 
incrementally prosecuted ideological campaign, to manufacture widespread support 
for the terrifying ambitions of politicians who, in Gouldner’s memorable insight, 
were disgusted by their own people.25 As Thatcher outlined the project in 1981: 
‘Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul’.26 
19 Theodore ADORNO, Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 349. 
20 Jamie PECK, Workfare States, New York: Guildford Press, 2001. 
21 David HARVEY, 2007, op. cit. 
22 Keith JOSEPH, ‘Speech at Edgbaston’, 1974, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2013, p. 11. 
23 Martin BECKFORD, ‘Tory Crime Tsar: Put “Shameless” Families through Two Years of 
Boot Camp Hell’, Daily Mail, 16 November 2013. 
24 Natalie CLARKE, ‘The Baby Machine’, Daily Mail, 22 February 2010. 
25 Alvin GOULDNER, The Dialectic of Technology and Ideology: The Origins, Grammar 
and Future of Ideology, London: Macmillan, 1976. 
26 Margaret THATCHER, ‘Interview for the Sunday Times’, 1981, Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation, 2013, p. 8. 
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Necessity 
However, the first phase of the long, bitter journey towards national workfare 
dependency began not under Thatcher, but under Callaghan’s Labour government. 
Labour came to power under Wilson in 1974 promising socialist policies—including 
increased welfare payments and major nationalisations.27 Callaghan assumed the 
Prime Ministership in 1976 and, following a crisis bail-out from the IMF, promptly 
adopted monetarist policies and regressive changes to the welfare system.28 
Callaghan subsequently used his 1976 Labour Party conference address to warn that: 
‘we used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession, and increase 
employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all 
candour that that option no longer exists’.29 The initial phase of neoliberal 
reorientation would thus not be Joseph’s naked class-racism, but the ideology of 
‘necessity’. Thatcher gave this phase its iconic rubric—‘TINA’ (there is no 
alternative)—shortly after the Conservative Party replaced Labour in power in 1979 
when she stated that ‘there’s no easy popularity in what we are proposing but it is 
fundamentally sound. Yet I believe people accept there’s no real alternative’.30 
Behind the scenes, Arthur Seldon, director of the neoliberal think-tank the Institute 
of Economic Affairs, was less circumspect, writing to neoliberal luminary Friedrich 
Hayek of his desire to ‘ram the truth [of neoliberal economics] down the throats of 
unwilling swallowers’.31 
Wielding the TINA ideology, the Thatcher government deliberately engineered 
a recession; ostensibly to tame inflation,32 but with the lucrative side-effect of 
producing a reserve labour army of 3.3 million people.33 The government’s response 
was not, contra Seldon, the truth, but bald deceit, with 190,000 unemployed people 
disappearing from official statistics almost overnight in 1983 due to a spurious 
change in counting method.34 According to the Bank of England, by 1990 this 
number had risen to 750,000 people.35 
With the help of an enlarged reserve labour army, rising wage costs were 
reversed by 198336—but this was merely the beginning of the neoliberalisation of 
the UK economy. A series of brutal industrial confrontations, combined with the 
passing of regressive legal instruments, weakened the labour movement 
27 Ann TALBOT, ‘The Death of James Callaghan: A Good Labour Man and the End of 
Reformism’, 2005, http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/mar2008/james_ callaghan.html. 
28 Ibid. 
29 James CALLAGHAN, ‘Leader’s Speech’, 1979, British Political Speech Archive, 2013, 
p. 8. 
30 Margaret THATCHER, 1980, art. cit., p. 2. 
31 Arthur SELDON, Letter to Friedrich Hayek, 1980, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2013, 
p. 1. 
32 Andrew CLARK & Richard LAYARD, op. cit. 
33 Kenneth HOOVER, op. cit., p. 213. 
34 Martin GODFREY, Global Unemployment: The New Challenge to Economic Theory, 
Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, p. 23. 
35 Andrew CLARK & Richard LAYARD, op. cit., p. 7. 
36 G. F. RAY, op. cit., p. 64. 
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significantly.37 Many older working class males, bred on strong unions and the 
expectation of decent wages, found little demand for their labour in the new 
economy of ‘flexible’, low-wage service work. Partly due to humiliating dole 
rituals38 the percentage of male over 55s exiting the labour market rose to 37% by 
the early 1990s, from 14% in 1977—primarily by shifting to sickness benefits.39 The 
number of full time males in the labour market overall, meanwhile, dropped by 
20%.40 
Already by 1986 the numbers of long-term (over one year) male unemployed 
in the UK had risen to around one million, from 100,000 in 1974.41 While significant 
rises in long-term and youth unemployment constituted a major structural change 
throughout the industrialised nations,42 the UK government was quick to adapt to the 
new reality, facilitating the intensified super-exploitation of the most vulnerable 
categories of cheap workers in order to supplant the expensive skilled male 
labourers now being held in cold-storage on a welfare pittance. British women, who 
were already ‘almost the lowest paid among [the major] industrial countries’,43 
subsequently saw two million, primarily female, full-time roles displaced by lower 
paid, more precarious part-time positions.44 A major pressurisation of welfare 
claimants accompanied the change, with the real value of benefits dropping by 15% 
for the poorest 20% of the population.45 Alterations to claimant procedures, 
meanwhile, saw desperate individuals and families lose vital benefits for minor 
administrative transgressions. As welfare minister John Major reported to 
Parliament in 1986 regarding the new dole-scheme Restart: ‘10,842 decisions to 
disallow benefit or credits [have] been made. Of these, 9,757 were as a result of a 
failure to attend an interview without good cause’.46 
To distract public attention from deliberately manufactured mass 
unemployment, a high-profile government campaign was launched in 1985 which, 
according to the Times, would ‘crackdown on people claiming unemployment 
benefit while secretly working’ and ‘cut the jobless total, believed by ministers to be 
artificially high in some areas’.47 As poverty rose, British neoliberal Digby 
Anderson—director of the right-wing Social Affairs Unit—encapsulated the Right’s 
37 David HARVEY, 2007, op. cit. 
38 Paul SPICKER, Stigma and Social Welfare, London: St. Martin’s Press, 1984. 
39 Heather TRICKEY & Robert WALKER, ‘Steps to Compulsion within British Labour 
Market Policies’, in Ivar LODEMEL & Heather TRICKEY (eds), An Offer You Can’t Refuse: 
Workfare in International Perspective, Bristol: Policy Press, 2000, p. 183. 
40 Eithne MCLAUGHLIN, ‘Flexibility and Polarisation’, in Michael WHITE, Unemployment, 
Public Policy and the Changing Labour Market, London: Policy Studies Institute, 1994, 
p. 14. 
41 Ibid., p. 9. 
42 Andrew CLARK & Richard LAYARD, op. cit. 
43 G. F. RAY, op. cit., p. 64. 
44 Desmond KING, The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship, Basingstoke: 
MacMillan Education, p. 193. 
45 Chris JONES & Tony NOVAK, Poverty, Welfare and the Disciplinary State, London: 
Routledge, 1999, p. 58. 
46 John MAJOR, ‘Mr Major’s Written Parliamentary Answer on Benefit Claimants’, 1986, 
JohnMajor.co.uk, 2013, p. 1. 
47 Philip WEBSTER, ‘Move to Curb the Dole Cheats’, Times, 5 August 1985, p. 1. 
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hardening disdain and increasingly detached callousness, musing, aristocratically: 
‘Why are the poor, especially in large numbers, so boring? […] I am not alone in 
finding the poor boring. Everyone does’.48 
Another crackdown was announced in 1987 targeting people ‘out of work 
without good cause’,49 which, according to Labour spokesman Michael Meacher, 
was ‘the first time in the history of the welfare state that families with children will 
be expected to survive on an income 40 per cent below the official subsistence level 
for a full six months’.50 
Meanwhile, under the guise of addressing the plight of the unemployed, the 
government re-jigged one of capitalism’s oldest terms for exploitation— 
‘apprenticeship’—to produce perhaps the most pernicious and misleading label for 
the super-exploited unemployed of the modern era: ‘training scheme participant’. 
Numbers of benefits claimants on such programmes rose from 8000 in 1982 to 
376,000 by 1988.51 In 1986 alone, in any average month 70,000 super-exploited 
workers were servicing UK industry under the guise of training or work 
experience.52 By 1985, 750,000 people had been churned in and out of the Youth 
Training Scheme as cheap labour for businesses, with plans announced in that year 
to exploit 500,000 more.53 Predictably, the exploitation of the young was 
ideologically greased by their demonisation. Social commentator Mark Godyer 
exemplified the trend, writing in the Times that ‘many problems abound, but 
dwarfing all the others, particularly in the summer holidays, is vandalism and petty 
crime, smashed telephone kiosks, defaced lavatories, smelly bus shelters, mutilated 
memorials’.54 Seeming eminently socially conscientious, the idea that ‘it is dishonest 
to preach the “right to a job” if we cannot realize that right for all citizens’55 
masked an emerging ideology that posited disciplinary labour—regardless of wage 
remuneration—and not the attenuation of poverty and hopelessness as the ‘cure’ for 
‘the new excluded underclass’.56 
However, as rubrics for super-exploitation go, ‘training scheme’ is particularly 
time-limited by the implied promise of eventual matriculation into actual 
employment. By 1986 it was already clear that this was not happening, as the 
proportion of UK unemployed who were long-term had not shrunk, but risen to 
40%, up from 20% in 1979,57 while youth unemployment now topped 1 million.58 
48 Digby ANDERSON, ‘Poverty’s Grey Battalions’, Times, 5 August 1986, p. 1. 
49 ‘New Benefit Cuts Loom for “Voluntary” Jobless’, Times, 11 November 1987, p. 1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Andrew CLARK & Richard LAYARD, op. cit., p. 45. 
52 Robert MILLER, The End of Unemployment, Sussex: Atlas Economic Research 
Foundation, 1988, p. 79. 
53 ‘Handsworth Warning: Inner-City Problems’, Times, 15 October 1985, p. 1. 
54 Mark GODYER, ‘Giving the Jobless some Dignity’, Times, 7 September 1985, p. 1. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Richard LAYARD, Stephen NICKELL & Richard JACKMAN, The Unemployment Crisis, 
Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 59. 
58 Louisa PEACOCK, ‘Youth Unemployment Breaks 1m Barrier’, Daily Telegraph, 
16 November 2011, p. 1. 
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The ideological grease was burning off ‘training scheme’, threatening to reveal the 
machinery of exploitation beneath. A new necessity-based ideological aperture 
appeared—and was promptly filled by ‘welfare dependency’. 
While the far-right of the Conservative Party had complained as early as 1973 
that welfare rendered recipients ‘wholly and permanently dependent on officials and 
politicians’,59 Conservative government minister John Moore introduced the idea of 
‘welfare dependence’ to the wider UK public in 1987, following a fact-finding trip 
to the United States. Attacking the post-war welfare consensus, Moore argued that 
‘a welfare state worthy of the name aims […] to widen the understanding that 
dependency is debilitating and that the best kind of help is that which gives people 
the will and ability to help themselves’.60 These words were not idly chosen; 
‘helping oneself’ was code for the introduction of US-style workfare schemes that 
forced the unemployed to work for their benefits.61 
The ideology of welfare dependency brought with it a bundle of concepts 
already functionally selected precisely for this purpose in the United States—where 
the shift towards workfare had begun in the 1960s.62 Significantly, this included the 
notion that welfare corrupted entire neighbourhoods by destroying family values and 
undermining the work ethic. In 1943, arch-neoliberal theorist Wilhelm Röpke had 
claimed that welfare transformed claimants into docile state ‘pets’,63 and it was a 
small logical step to argue that, freed from the discipline of work and self-reliance, 
the pets had inevitably gone feral. Charles Murray described this putatively 
inevitable degeneration as ‘welfare’s law of unintended consequences’.64 In support, 
Digby Anderson, unable—or unprepared—to comprehend the coexistence of 
welfare and poverty in the UK as a palliative, not causal relationship, deployed 
chauvinism’s primary ideological weapon—presenting prejudice as evidence of 
itself—by arguing that there was ‘many a pub or bus stop conversation to endorse 
Charles Murray’s American study’.65 In 1989 Murray returned the favour, arguing in 
the British press that the underclass ‘disease’ had now spread to the UK.66 
Murray’s argument was by no means new, however: Joseph had spoken of a 
‘cycle of deprivation’,67 and before him, Moynihan of a ‘tangle of pathology’68—and 
59 SELSDON GROUP, ‘The Selsdon Manifesto’, 1970, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2013, 
p. 5. 
60 David P. DOLOWITZ, Learning from America: Policy Transfer and the Development of 
the British Workfare State, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998, p. 9. 
61 Jamie PECK, 2001, op. cit. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Wilhelm RÖPKE, The Social Crisis of Our Times, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1948, p. 163. 
64 Charles MURRAY, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980, New York: Basic 
Books, 1984. 
65 Digby ANDERSON, op. cit., p. 2. 
66 Joan BROWN, ‘The Focus on Single Mothers’ in Ruth LISTER, Charles Murray and the 
Underclass: The Developing Debate, London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1996, p. 69. 
67 Keith JOSEPH, loc. cit. 
68 Daniel P. MOYNIHAN, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, Office of Policy 
Planning and Research, United States Department of Labour, 1965. 
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there were many earlier iterations, stretching back to England’s Statute of Labourers 
in 1351. The idea was so old, in fact, that James Mill had punctured its underlying 
tautology in 1808, noting that ‘it is first making the vices of the poor account for the 
poor rate, and next the poor’s rate account for the vices’.69 Nevertheless, material 
realities re-selected the notion; now neatly dovetailed with neoclassical ‘hysteresis’ 
arguments that characterised welfare as precipitating the psychological degeneration 
of claimants, causing them to withdraw from the job market—artificially raising the 
price of labour and so causing employers to cut down on hiring.70 Unemployment, in 
other words, was argued to be causing itself. As Conservative MP Ralph Howell put 
it in 1994: ‘To offer people the chance to work and contribute a bit to the community 
must be better than trapping them in a depressing state of enforced idleness that 
leaves them less and less able to get back to work’.71 
However, like many other libertarians, signally Nozick72 and Gilder,73 Murray 
recommended the near-total abrogation of welfare, musing: ‘Why should I not let [a 
man who refuses to work] starve, considering it a form of suicide?’74 Influential 
anarcho-capitalist Murray Rothbard went much further, arguing that even allowing 
babies to starve to death was justifiable according to the ‘ethics of liberty’, as babies 
had no legitimate property claims over others.75 But dead workers do not produce 
surplus value, and dead babies offer little leverage over their mothers, and so this 
position was not functionally selected by the ruling elite. 
In 1986, US sociologist Lawrence Mead took over Murray’s territory and, 
functionally selecting what was useful in it, added the notion that over-generous, 
unconditional welfare had corrupted the ‘underclass’ to such a degree that 
disciplinary socialisation in the form of workfare programmes was now necessary. 
These programmes were to be highly disciplinary, and modelled on the military 
where ‘the clearest example of […] standard setting occurs’.76 Low-paid work was 
to be mandated—but compensated for with a priceless wage of citizenship and 
enhanced self-esteem. As Mead put it: ‘The rich man who puts in long hours in an 
office on Wall Street is seen as morally equivalent to the welfare recipient on 
workfare who is made to clean the streets’.77 Work, in other words, was to be 
transformed into its own wages. Soon Mead was on UK television promoting neo- 
Benthamite pauper control schemes,78 while his Hannah Arendt-inspired argument 
that workfare underpinned ‘active’ citizenship began to be touted by left-leaning 
intellectuals as ‘fair’ and not necessarily contrary to socialism.79 Eminent sociologist 
69 James MILL, On the Overproduction and Underconsumption Fallacies, Jefferson School 
of Philosophy, 1808, p. 15. 
70 Richard LAYARD et al., op. cit. 
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Ralf Dahrendorf was less convinced, characterising Mead’s theories as ‘almost 
totalitarian’.80 
Regardless, Mead’s ideas were needed. By the mid-1980s, despite suffering a 
serious ‘credibility problem’,81 training schemes had become a structural element of 
UK economic policy—not only supplying cheap labour to industry and helping to 
mask unemployment, but also acting as a retardant on real wage values—seen as one 
key to increased ‘competitiveness’.82 However, with the number of UK citizens 
living in poverty rising dramatically between 1983 and 1986, from 9 million to 10 
million,83 social security minister John Major was having difficulty defending 
current policies, able merely to insist glibly that continuing the Conservative Party’s 
welfare reforms was the only real answer.84 But any glutton would argue the same; 
the difficulty was in justifying the position. Hence, sweeping aside Thatcher’s 
neoliberal instinct that the very idea of an ‘underclass’ was ‘socialist claptrap’,85 
Mead’s work was functionally selected into elite political discourse. In an 
enthusiastic article in support of workfare entitled ‘Purge of the Parasites’, journalist 
P. Potts thus reported that ‘Mrs Thatcher recently became interested in workfare 
after watching a television programme about it. The next morning she dispatched a 
note to ministers asking for their thoughts’.86 Perversely, Mead’s unsympathetic 
notion of an intransigent, criminal, pathologically idle underclass not only shifted 
the blame for training scheme failures onto their victims, it also transformed those 
failures into justifications for their intensification. Far from being the ‘godfather’ of 
workfare, as one media sycophant would later style him,87 Mead was its pimp, 
hooking-up the early workfare-dependent economy with an easy, proleaphobic 
ideology: ‘Low-wage work’, Mead argued, ‘apparently must be mandated, just as a 
draft has sometimes been necessary to staff the military’.88 This, he claimed, was the 
only reliable means of ‘dissolving’ the ‘welfare class’.89 
Particularly useful to the UK regime was Mead’s demonisation of single 
mothers. Mead attacked their ‘refusal to take “dirty” jobs that they feel are beneath 
them’ as ‘political behaviour’ designed to force society to ‘adjust to them’ [Mead’s 
emphasis].90 With 578,000 single mothers surviving on supplementary benefit in 
1986 (365,000 of these divorced or separated),91 Mead’s argument that they should 
not be allowed to ‘blackmail’ society, but instead be mandated to perform unskilled 
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service work—which they were ‘most easily qualified to do’92—dovetailed neatly 
with both the economic imperatives of the servile economy and also the patriarchal 
culture which, as Beck argues, makes single parenthood the surest route to poverty 
for European women.93 
In 1998, Margaret Thatcher revealed her contempt of single mothers, arguing 
that they ‘devalue […] our community’,94 but the opposite was true—they, and their 
children, were an extremely valuable potential resource, and the venal obloquy 
inflicted upon them throughout the 1980s should be seen in this light. Signally, 
government minister Rhodes Boyson condemned single mothers as responsible for 
‘probably the most evil product of our time’—‘uncontrolled male young’ who 
perpetrated ‘violent crime, […] football hooliganism, mugging and inner city 
revolt’.95 Meanwhile, the pernicious spread of neoliberal ideology to the Labour 
Party was signalled in 1989 when Labour MP Frank Field declared that ‘for the first 
time groups of unemployed and young single mothers don’t think the offer of 
rejoining mainstream Britain is worth taking. They opt consciously to stay on the 
outside’.96 Field’s solution was not to make work worthwhile, or to value parenting 
in itself, but to shift women towards workfare. This pincer-movement, between 
Conservative class-racism and Labour’s crocodile-tear paternalism, would prove 
characteristic of the pseudo-debate between right- and left-right that swept the road 
to national workfare dependency. 
The term underclass, meanwhile, maintained not only its class-racist, but also 
its actual racist inflections.97 Signally, the Independent Audit Commission produced 
a major report in 1987 in which director John Banham spoke of a ‘horrific’ situation 
in which ‘a 15-year-old black is having her third child by different fathers’, 
unemployment stands at 80 per cent, gangs roam the streets, drug-related crime is 
rife and ‘you have to set up crèches in schools’.98 The solution, Banham suggested, 
was ‘a productive partnership [with] the private sector’. Workfare, in other words. 
However, Banham was not quite as independent as he seemed: he was shortly to 
assume leadership of the Confederation of British Industries,99 a major capitalist 
organisation which, in 1985, had argued that government unemployment training 
schemes had ‘yielded big dividends, with an enormous amount of companies 
[becoming] deeply and actively involved’ and that efforts should be ‘devoted to 
expanding them’.100 
Media allies of the bourgeoisie, not for the first or last time, supported the 
agenda, blurring class-racist comedy with reality, with the Daily Express asking: 
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‘Can we really tolerate a system in which dole frauds alone cost £500 million a year 
and have become a standing joke on a Saturday night comedy TV show?’101 The 
same paper, only a few days earlier, had described the expansion of training 
schemes to instil ‘discipline’ into young workers as a ‘cause for cheer for job 
seekers’, stating that while ‘a place on a training scheme is not as good as a job, 
[…] it is the next best thing’.102 It is more accurate to say that, for the bourgeoisie, 
workfare schemes were much better than employing and properly remunerating 
people. 
In 1988, the Conservative Party initiated a venal campaign of welfare claimant 
demonisation aimed at driving the poor into workfare and low-wage work.103 
Terrifying hate-language resurfaced, with the Daily Express announcing an 
imminent ‘welfare purge on single mothers’.104 Little was off-limits: in a speech 
vowing to end the UK’s ‘scrounger culture’, Minister John Moore claimed that a 
pregnant ‘unmarried girl’, having miscarried and so lost her eligibility to 
somewhere to live, had complained to him that it was ‘silly to make her move 
because she was going to get pregnant anytime. “I’m working on it now” she 
said’.105 Extracting ghastly political capital, Moore concluded that it was sad to see 
people ‘caught in the dependency culture, sat passive in the face of new 
opportunities’.106 
One such ‘new opportunity’ was the Employment for Training workfare 
scheme, introduced in 1988 at a cost £1.4 billion and intended to provide 600,000 
‘training scheme’ placements for the long-term unemployed.107 The scheme was, 
according to its White Paper, necessary in order to address the complex problem-set 
faced by the long-term unemployed, including benefit dependence and low 
motivation.108 In the same year, control and exploitation of children was intensified 
as all 16- and 17-year-old benefits claimants were mandated to attend the Youth 
Training Scheme. According to social policy expert Professor Alan Walker, this 
scheme was ‘slave labour’ and had ‘a fatal accident rate of 138.2 per 100,000’.109 
However, with places on the scheme limited, many young people simply lost their 
eligibility to welfare altogether, forcing them into destitution and/or the black 
economy.110 
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With middle income earners now being squeezed to fund cheap labour 
schemes for the benefit of businesses,111 Chancellor Norman Fowler diverted 
taxpayers’ ire towards benefit fraud, announcing at the 1988 Conservative Party 
conference that ‘we are not prepared to see taxpayers’ money being used to finance 
the fraudulent. It is a totally unnecessary imposition on those in work paying taxes 
and, above all, it is an insult to the genuinely unemployed in this country’.112 In 
reality, UK businesses had developed a significant, tax-funded, cheap-labour habit, 
with the supply now extending well beyond dole claimants: numbers receiving the 
Family Tax Credit—a supplementary benefit for low-wage workers—for example, 
had risen from 71,000 in its introductory year of 1971, to 199,000 in 1985, and to 
317,000 by 1990.113 However, Fowler was considerably less squeamish about 
insulting the public when it came to wage increases, complaining that they 
‘discourage employers from taking on more staff, and reduce opportunities for 
expanding’.114 
By 1989, average wage values for low-skilled workers plummeted between 
10% and 25%,115 while the numbers of service sector roles rose 23.8% on 1979 
figures.116 John Moore dismissed complaints of rising poverty, declaring ‘the end of 
the line’ for anything but voluntary indigence.117 In fact, relative poverty increased 
significantly through the 1980s and ‘the growth of child poverty on the relative 
measure was particularly alarming, with a rate of 12% in 1979 rising to 27% by 
1992’.118 
As predicted by Marxist economics,119 this intensified exploitation of the poor 
contributed toward a temporary upturn in the business cycle: the so-called Lawson 
boom. The boom bust in 1989, with inflation rocketing to 7.5% by 1991, and 
unemployment rising by 500,000.120 A campaign of welfare ‘reform’ and claimant 
demonisation followed, so vicious that Westergaard described it as ‘the attrition of 
citizenship’.121 Signally, in 1992, with a whiff of Pinochet Social Security minister 
Peter Lilley announced: ‘I’ve got a little list, of benefit offenders who I’ll soon be 
rooting out, and who never would be missed’.122 Unsurprisingly, this list included 
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‘young ladies who get pregnant just to jump the housing queue’.123 Dismissing the 
engulfing misery, Chancellor Norman Lamont took the line that ‘rising 
unemployment and the recession have been the price that we have had to pay to get 
inflation down. That price is well worth paying’.124 
While inflation was again wrested down to 2% by 1994, the new threat to the 
now intensely globalising system was the collapse of global growth rates: down 
from 3.5% in the 1960s to 1.1% in the 1990s,125 with the UK rate going negative in 
1991.126 By no coincidence, from the late 1980s the term ‘feckless’, with its core 
sense of inability to produce anything of value, began to migrate from descriptions 
of absent fathers to the general unemployed. As Kilroy-Silk signally phrased it, 
‘hard-working members of the community [should not] have to tend to the needs of 
the lazy and feckless’.127 
Despite 61 million people living below the poverty line across Europe,128 lifecrippling 
low-pay was cynically justified as positive and unavoidable by bourgeois 
academics: ‘if employers pay a living wage, they simply will not want to employ all 
the available labour’.129 Politicians were little better, with now Prime Minister John 
Major arguing that ‘the minimum wage [makes it] more difficult for people to find 
work’.130 The Conservative answer was more workfare, with Employment Minister 
Michael Portillo announcing in 1995 yet another new scheme—Network—in which 
16-18 year old workers would be paid primarily in training and work experience.131 
Meanwhile, the potential cash value of transforming benefits claimants into superexploited 
workers was underlined when Conservative MP Ralph Howell published, 
via the neoliberal think-tank the Adam Smith Institute, a thinly veiled call for 
workfare, arguing in the Observer that ‘we spend £10 billion per year supporting the 
unemployed. We could offer work to everyone who wants it for roughly the same 
money’.132 
However, in the ever more interconnected world-market, the Conservative 
Party was now only one minor power in a vast neoliberal network. With an 
unprecedented global glut of potential low-wage workers, all European capitalists 
now faced an intensive struggle to maintain growth and global market share.133 
Notably, in 1995 the European Union’s Competitiveness Advisory Group warned of 
a significant ‘decline in the ability of the Union to exploit its productive potential to 
123 Ibid. 
124 HANSARD, HC 6Ser vol. 191 col 413, 16 May 1991. 
125 David HARVEY, 2007, op. cit., p. 154. 
126 ‘Economy Tracker: GDP’, BBC News, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10613201. 
127 Robert KILROY-SILK, ‘Workers Who Won’t’, Times, 18 March 1988, p. 1. 
128 John DITCH & Ellen ROBERTS, Integrated Approaches to Active Welfare and 
Employment Policies, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, 2002, p. 14. 
129 Andrew CLARK & Richard LAYARD, op. cit., p. 73. 
130 John MAJOR, ‘Leader’s Speech’, British Political Speech Archive, 1996, p. 5. 
131 J. HOLLAND, ‘Working at the Training Connection’, Daily Express, 16 February 1995. 
132 Dean NELSON, ‘The Freedom to Earn Your Benefits’, Observer, 18 September 1994, p. 1. 
133 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Global Europe: EU Performance in the Global Economy, 
2008. 
232 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE CIVILISATION BRITANNIQUE — VOL. 19 N° 1 
the full’ due primarily to ‘eight million permanently unemployed’, and too low rates 
of females and long-term unemployed engaged in the labour market.134 The solution 
was the expansion of exploitation beyond its contemporary, limited remit, to force 
individuals previously protected under sickness, single-parent or other ‘passive’ 
long-term unemployment status into ‘active’ labour market regimes.135 
In 1997 the European Union’s Jobs Summit directed member states to activate 
further workfare schemes to drive, initially, 20% of this ‘passive’ group back into 
the labour market.136 However, work-for-benefits, not actual jobs, was to be, as 
Bruttel and Sol put it, ‘the underlying paradigm of the European employment 
strategy’.137 Member states drew-up ‘National Action Plans’ to steer this project 
locally138 but administering them required reinvigorated steering committees armed 
with new ideological weapons. As Tony Blair put it, following neoliberal Labour’s 
sweep to power in 1997, ‘the job of refashioning welfare and the job of refashioning 
government are inseparable’.139 This new governmentality would be, as Jessop had 
previously predicted,140 a ‘workfare state’. 
The Conservative party might have managed this restructuration in the UK— 
and later did—but they lost the 1997 election. Besides which, the old ideology of 
welfare dependency, although still very much part of the neoliberal rhetorical suite, 
was, by itself, too shallow to justify the vast economic reorientation now required of 
member states: despite Tony Blair claiming in 1995 that there were ‘two Britains, 
one on welfare, the other paying for it’,141 in reality, by 1997 unemployment 
benefits accounted for only 9% of total social security spending in the UK,142 and 
only 8% across the European Community as a whole.143 The corrosive effects of 
neoliberalism in the UK in the early 1990s were far too extensive to hang onto this 
little peg; particularly the ‘exceptional’ growth of inequality which saw the richest 
10% increase their income by close to 70%, and the poorest decile suffer an 
effective 8% decrease.144 An ideological canopy of a whole new order was required. 
This could have taken numerous forms, but it needed, as its foundation rationale, to 
protect neoliberal wealth-theft: returning pilfered capital was off the table and any 
suggestion of such had to be denounced as pointless. This ideological void drew up, 
via capillary need, a natural extension of the dependency thesis: that it was not 
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welfare, but welfare claimants that were the problem. In fact, more than a problem, a 
national threat; a group—almost an ethnicity—whose pathological culture emitted a 
destructive moral radiation that destabilised surrounding communities, corrupted 
children and threatened to undermine both social order and the economy. As the 
Sunday Times had put it in an early ideological rehearsal in 1993, ‘the growth of a 
hard core of long-term unemployed and the spreading culture of welfare 
dependency have brutalised British society well beyond its developing underclass 
and undermined much of what we thought made this country civilised’.145 The 
outgoing Major government attempted to adapt its ideology to this intensified classracism 
with a disastrous ‘back to basics’ moral crusade: a jeremiad which managed 
to juxtapose child pornography, crime, the Yugoslavian conflict and Irish terrorism 
with ‘accepting a responsibility for yourself and your family and not shuffling off on 
other people and the state’.146 But this was merely a desperate, local ideological 
mutation which rapidly self-aborted in toxic pools of hypocrisy. Behind Major’s 
back, at the global neoliberal level, the tumbler of ideological functional selectivity 
was piecing together a profoundly more effective discourse: social exclusion. 
Social exclusion 
‘Social exclusion’ has been identified by scholars such as Lodemel and 
Trickey,147 Skeggs,148 Cameron and Palan,149 Byrne150 and Crompton151 as a key 
strut in the ideological architecture of neoliberalism. However, there was never one 
version of this idea that achieved neoliberal hegemony: continually functionally reselected 
for the plasticity of its ideological infrastructure, ‘social exclusion’ should 
be seen, rather, as a continuum of implications which steadily adapted to material 
imperatives—eventually, in the UK, evolving into the ideology of ‘Broken Britain’. 
The idea of social exclusion initially emerged in radical French critiques of 
socially corrosive economic policy.152 In 1995, the United Nations’ Social 
Development Summit partially adopted this critique, stating that ‘full and adequately 
and appropriately remunerated employment is an effective method of combating 
poverty and promoting social integration’.153 However, this, by definition, 
contradicted the European Union’s workfare paradigm; and with the colossal 
expansion of the EU’s reserve labour army to 15.7 million by 1999,154 Europe’s 
workfare trajectory was intransigently set at the economic base. Rather, bombarded 
by the intense pressure of economic reality, the meaning of social exclusion itself 
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buckled, eventually fully inverting to become a justification for socially corrosive 
policies. As the European Commission put it, ‘the aim of [social inclusion] policy is 
to strengthen incentives to work and to improve the adaptability and employability 
of the work force’.155 By emphasising ‘the complex and multidimensional nature of 
poverty and social exclusion’,156 European Union apparatchiks began to re-image 
poverty, not as lack of income, but as a broadly ‘psycho-social’ issue—a 
behavioural, cultural and attitudinal matter—and the solution, therefore, not as full 
and adequate remuneration for work, but as ‘reintegration into society through 
linking welfare and work’.157 Via the ideology of social exclusion, work-for-welfare 
was thus transformed into an apparent mechanism of ‘cultural matriculation’ which 
could re-qualify the poor as members of society happily clutching wage packets 
filled with self-esteem and social membership. All that remained was for national 
administrations to sell the idea to their populations. 
Tony Blair—typically ‘on message’—downloaded the new ideology into UK 
political discourse: ‘Social exclusion is about income but it is about more. It’s […] 
damaging to self-esteem, more corrosive to society as a whole, more likely to be 
passed from generation to generation than material poverty’.158 What was only 9% 
of the UK benefits budget thus became, via words, something apparently massive: 
an ‘underclass of people cut off from society’s mainstream, without any sense of 
shared purpose’.159 With facts overcome by whimsical appeal to ‘what we all know 
exists’,160 capital exclusion was thus rhetorically inverted to justify a significant 
intensification of social discipline and pauper exploitation; a major neoliberal 
reorganisation of the UK economy dwarfing anything that the Conservatives had 
managed to achieve. Such a project required an ideological justification of similar 
proportions: an extensive continuum of deceit, adapted cynically to varying levels of 
gullibility. 
At the apex of this continuum the government argued that ‘for people of 
working age, a job is the best route out of poverty’,161 and that work was the key 
weapon in the ‘fight against poverty and social exclusion’.162 In reality, the country 
was being transformed into a low-wage, workfare-dependent state: a series of ‘New 
Deal’ workfare programmes were set up between 1998 and 2010, aimed at driving 
‘inactive’ benefits claimants into the active reserve labour army. As minister Peter 
Hain put it, ‘we must push forwards with further reform […] focusing on the 4.5 
million people of working age on out-of-work benefits’.163 In fact, only 5.6% of New 
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Deal participants ever matriculated into employment.164 However, this seeming total 
failure was actually a significant success for the capitalist class. As Marxist 
economist Bob Milward explains, ‘the reserve labour army allows the total 
domination of capital over labour. It is the key economic force which keeps the real 
wage down to subsistence level’ [Milward’s emphasis].165 Meanwhile, poor working 
people—encouraged to see the unemployed as ‘scroungers who won’t get a job’166 
and as ‘parasites’ who ‘breed for greed’ and ‘grow fat on your taxes’167—were 
themselves being transformed into low-wage, benefit-dependent workers, with tax 
credit spending rising ‘from £3.3 billion in 1997-98 to more than £20 billion by 
2010-11’168—paid for not from the corpulent coffers of firms, but from the squeezed 
pay-packets of middle-income earners.169 
In 2008, neoliberal Labour introduced the Flexible New Deal—a major 
mergence and expansion of previous New Deal schemes. This scheme mandated the 
long-term unemployed into disciplinary institutions for one year of ‘re-training’. 
Somewhere close to half of its 405,000 ‘clients’ were sent to service businesses with 
free labour for periods of ‘four or more weeks’ at a time,170 while the rest were held 
in disciplinary cold-storage.171 Labour’s much mooted minimum-wage legislation 
did not apply to these people—nor to any ‘clients’ who found temporary paid 
work.172 
New Prime Minister Gordon Brown lionised the intensified regime by arguing 
that Labour was creating ‘opportunity for all […] matched with a new responsibility 
from all. Our aim is a something for something, nothing for nothing Britain. A 
Britain of fair chances’.173 It was a grotesque lie, intended to demonise the 
unemployed for failing to take advantage of unprecedented levels of opportunity. 
Quite contrarily, as the government’s own National Equality Panel delicately put it, 
it was ‘hard […] to sustain an argument that what we show [grossly increased, 
socially entrenched inequality] is the result of personal choices against a 
background of opportunity, however defined’.174 In fact, as the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation reported, ‘by 2008/2009 13m people were in poverty. Of these, 5.8m 
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(44% of the total) were in “deep poverty” (household income at least one-third 
below the poverty line), the highest proportion on record’.175 Meanwhile, seven 
million UK citizens were suffering in-work poverty,176 with half of all UK children 
who were surviving in poverty living in working families.177 But with work now the 
marker of cultural matriculation into ‘social inclusion’, minister Peter Hain was able 
to fudge the reality by emphasising that ‘the rewards of work […] go far beyond 
financial independence […] because work is inherently good’,178 while neoliberal 
apologist Simon Heffer argued that poor-work at less-than-benefit levels was ‘the 
price they [low-wage workers] pay for dignity, decency, self-respect’.179 
However, the reality of the New Deals was difficult to reconcile with the true 
scope of capital exclusion—and a lie inevitably emerged of a ‘hard-core’ who were 
resistant to Labour’s paternalist interventions. As minister Peter Mandelson 
complained, ‘we are spending vast sums of money, often over and over again, on the 
same people through different programmes, without improving their ability to 
participate in the economy and society’.180 Bizarrely, some of the socially excluded 
were characterised as so hard-core that it would be necessary, according to Tony 
Blair, to target them while they were still foetuses.181 Oppression of the unemployed 
was intensified, meanwhile, as ‘the number of sanctioned jobseekers with a reduced 
entitlement to JSA doubled in 2010 to around 800,000’.182 
A dangerous notion was forming: that some people simply could not be 
included. And this propaganda game was soon out of the control of Labour’s spindoctors; 
in fact, it had already emerged amongst the attack-dogs of the neoliberal 
media who pushed the idea almost as far is it could possibly go in socially excluding 
the poor as an utterly alien, immoral culture who were a threat, as Phillips 
disturbingly put it, to the nation’s ‘social and moral health’:183 ‘Britain’s feckless, 
thuggish, self-pitying, sponging criminal underclass’;184 ‘that terrifying growing 
175 JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION, Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion, 2010, 
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phenomenon: a feckless, amoral, workshy, benefit-dependent underclass’;185 
‘scroungers who try to take a free ride on the backs of others’;186 ‘an ever-growing 
subculture of neglect, violence, drugs, pornography, crime and unemployment’;187 
‘scum. Sorry, but there’s no other word for it’.188 With glib hypocrisy, journalists 
who simpered over the fate of ‘underclass’ children simultaneously used their 
images and identities in exploitative photo-shoots.189 Class-racist hate was 
celebrated: ‘Hurrah for the chav-hating holiday boss—champion of the middleclass!’ 
190 Those workers, meanwhile, whose wage values had collapsed to close to 
unemployment benefit levels were encouraged not to hate the system, but to despise 
those already surviving on an unemployment pittance: ‘Ignore leftist hysteria—at 
last Britain has woken up to the grotesque irony that so many on welfare are better 
off than hard working families’.191 Fiction overtook reality as class-racist comedy 
shows and characters such as Wayne and Waynetta Slob,192 Vicky Pollard,193 and 
Shameless194 became emblematic of ‘a daily tragedy whose victims, like Shannon 
Matthews, are all too real’.195 Conservative Shadow Home Secretary Chris Grayling 
took this blurring of fantasy and reality to quixotic heights, bruiting the US fictional 
television drama The Wire as an accurate representation of the ‘urban war’, ‘culture 
of violence’, and ‘collapse of civilised life’ plaguing Britain.196 At the bottom of the 
continuum of deceit, class-racists used the internet to spew vile ‘solutions’, with 
even a mainstream journalist eventually feeling safe to muse: ‘Of course, forcibly 
sterilising a woman is something that cannot be countenanced in a civilised 
society—or can it?’197 
Following the 2008 economic crisis, neoliberal Labour’s ideology began to 
buckle under the weight of economic reality. Blair’s crocodile-tear appeals for social 
inclusion were largely abandoned, with Gordon Brown dropping the phrase 
altogether from his 2008 leadership speech. A new ideology was emerging: that only 
those who worked, and worked hard, really mattered: ‘my starting point is onenation, 
rooted in a commitment to common democratic citizenship. It is 
185 Amanda PLATELL, ‘Shannon’s Mother and Seven Babies by Six Men’, Daily Mail, 
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unashamedly majoritarian, focusing on the concerns of the hard working 
majority’.198 
Broken Britain 
The Conservative Party, meanwhile, had been following its class instincts and 
mooting poor women as the primary grist of economic recovery: around 2006, Tory 
spin-doctors and their media allies began aggressively pushing the sound-bite 
‘Breakdown’ or ‘Broken-down’ Britain,199 with the primary connotation of broken 
homes—and the truth-reversing conclusion that ‘one of the most important factors 
implicated in poverty and a low sense of well-being is family breakdown’.200 
However, ‘Breakdown Britain’ was a clumsy phrase that implied either total 
hopelessness, or else a satisfactory fix in the near future—neither of which usefully 
justified the oncoming scale of economic transformation which would see the 
impoverishment and intensified disciplinary control of much of the population. The 
tumbler of functional selectivity spun-on until it fell, eventually, into the ideological 
configuration of ‘Broken Britain’. 
Early in 2007, the Times reported David Cameron as pledging to mend 
‘“Broken” Britain’,201 with the word ‘broken’ in quotation marks. In July, the 
Edinburgh Evening News quoted Cameron as stating that ‘“repairing broken 
Britain” would combine cutting the cost to business and the taxpayer with 
increasing social justice’.202 By mid-2007, the term was a Cameron catchphrase, 
with the Evening Standard reporting: ‘I want to fix broken Britain, Cameron tells 
critics’.203 By the end of the year the term had become a media buzz-phrase in its 
own right, with Daily Express editor Martin Townsend complaining that in ‘broken 
Britain’ a ‘Leftie-liberal agenda’ had ‘kicked away the building blocks’ that created 
World War Two heroes.204 
Early in 2008 the neoliberal elite fully captured the phrase as the Sun 
newspaper, in partnership with David Cameron, launched a major ‘Broken Britain’ 
campaign. Capitalising ‘Broken’, it was reported that ‘yesterday David Cameron 
unveiled his plans to mend Broken Britain’.205 The new ideological paradigm was 
that Britain was ‘a society at breaking point’, and the answer, ‘work for welfare’ to 
‘make poverty history’.206 
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The Broken Britain narrative retained an intensive focus on driving female 
heads of household into poor work—not necessarily to lift them from poverty, but 
because, argued Cameron, ‘the transition from worklessness to work has beneficial 
effects on both parents and children alike’.207 But the new ideology was to go much 
further ‘to build a welfare-to-work programme that goes so far, in scale, beyond 
[Labour’s] limited plans’.208 
With work-for-welfare already contributing to an increase in inequality—both 
of opportunity and income—so great that the National Equality Panel warned that 
the ‘sheer scale’ of it ‘for many readers […] will be shocking’209—selling an 
intensified crackdown on the reserve labour army required a whole new level of 
cynical propaganda. The primary weapon in this project was the recoding of the real 
‘break’ in Britain—that between rich and poor—into the fairy-tale of an urban 
conflict between the imagined moral dead-zones of welfare-dependent ‘sprawling 
council estates’210 and an ideological realm populated by middle-class ‘hardworking 
families’.211 High profile crimes were cynically exploited to widen the gap. Signally, 
making political capital from a famous child abduction case, David Cameron 
damned the poor for something they had not even done, stating that ‘there are 5 
million people on benefits in Britain. How do we stop them turning into Karen 
Matthews?’. Cameron then linked this crime with ‘an estate where decency fights a 
losing battle against degradation and despair. A community whose pillars are 
crime, unemployment and addiction. […] Before her [Mathews] there was Baby P, a 
tiny boy beaten by lower-than-life thugs. Before him, there was Shaun Dykes, a 
suicidal teenager taunted by a gang of yobs to end his own life. Before him, there 
was Rhys Jones, shot dead as he cycled home from football practice. It goes on’.212 
Media allies pushed the agenda: ‘In these households and in these areas, where 
people fuelled by a constant flow of drugs, alcohol and pornography exist outside 
the norms of civilised behaviour, society most definitely is broken. […] It can’t be 
restored unless welfare dependency is stopped dead in its tracks’.213 The public were 
nudged towards the required conclusion: ‘EVERY candidate standing in the general 
election should read […] the comments of Beryl Teasdale about the state of British 
society. After seeing young thug Jessica Parry jailed for attempting to rob her, 73- 
year-old Beryl said: “When I was her age I was working around the clock”’.214 
In 2010 a new Conservative-led coalition government came to power. They 
inherited a neoliberal economic reorientation in full swing. In 2011, 81% of the UK 
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workforce, and 92% of working women, were employed in the services sector.215 
The workfare-dependent sector of the economy, meanwhile, was big and hungry— 
and seemingly more needed than ever, with growth at 1.1%, going negative to minus 
0.2% in 2012.216 In 2011, the new regime launched its Work Programme—a major 
expansion of workfare predicted to force around 3.3 million people into disciplinary 
workfare centres by 2016217—the same number initially made unemployed by the 
early Thatcher government. With around 900 sub-contractors nationally,218 the Work 
Programme marked a major intensification of workfare. 
In his pre-launch press-release for the scheme, Conservative welfare minister 
Iain Duncan Smith claimed that the Work Programme constituted a ‘radical welfare 
reform designed to tackle entrenched poverty and end the curse of intergenerational 
worklessness’.219 Blaming jobless parents for influencing their children into 
choosing welfare as a preferred lifestyle, Smith argued that ‘family is the most 
important influence on a child’s life, so it is no surprise that with this many children 
growing up with parents on benefits we are facing intergenerational worklessness. 
[…] Our broken welfare system has reinforced this destructive cycle for 
generations, root and branch reform is long overdue’.220 In reality, the UK 
government kept no records showing that intergenerational unemployment even 
existed.221 Rather, thirty years of deliberate and cynical labour market 
destabilisation, and consequent economic impoverishment, was being parasitised as 
evidence for the necessity of more of the same. 
To boost support for workfare as an essential, even philanthropic project, the 
government initiated a propaganda campaign claiming that there were 120,000 
seriously dysfunctional underclass families in the UK who alone cost the country £9 
billion per year. They were, argued Cameron, ‘sealed in their circumstances with a 
weekly welfare cheque’, and required ‘help to turn their lives around and heal the 
scars of the broken society’.222 In 2012, government advisor Louise Casey’s codsociological 
report Listening to Troubled Families appeared just in time to aid the 
fiction: choosing to describe rape and sexual abuse (in one case perpetrated by an 
apparently unrelated neighbour) as ‘incest’, Casey speciously juxtaposed her 
findings with discussion of these 120,000 families, tentatively insinuating that they 
were, as a group, the bearers of repulsively dysfunctional social mores, vitiated by 
welfare dependency.223 Even the right-leaning Daily Mail however, which had 
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initially welcomed the findings, printed a partial retraction once it was realised that 
Casey’s report was based on only 16 loosely investigated case studies.224 In fact, the 
government’s definition of ‘troubled families’ was based entirely on poverty, poor 
opportunity, deprivation and ill health, and not criminal or ‘dysfunctional’ 
behaviour.225 Nevertheless, yet again deploying indigence as evidence to support 
more of what caused it, the government mooted placing these ‘troubled families’ 
onto a quasi-food-stamp scheme,226 potentially reducing them to the most basic level 
of survival permitted by law—and possibly extending this scheme to another 
400,000 households.227 
Speaking in 2012, meanwhile, Cameron argued that ‘first, we must treat the 
causes of poverty at their source. […] Second, we’ve got to recognise that in the 
end, the only thing that really beats poverty, long-term, is work’.228 In reality, by 
2012 13 million UK citizens lived in poverty, half in working families, with another 
two million artificially missing from the data because average incomes fell 8% on 
2008 figures, superficially ‘lifting’ them out of the reckoning.229 Furthermore, there 
were record numbers of childless, working-age people in poverty, while 4.8 million 
people were churned in and out of unemployment benefits—and 5 million people 
were working for below the minimum wage.230 By Cameron’s own admission, the 
average UK household was now £3,000 a year worse off compared to 2007.231 
In its first year the Work Programme experienced a failure rate of 97%.232 By 
2014, this figure was unchanged.233 The neoliberal regime’s response was, as it had 
been for the previous thirty years, more of the same: a ‘crackdown on migrants’ 
benefits’;234 for British youth, ‘if they are still unemployed after six months, they will 
have to start a traineeship, take work experience or do a community work 
placement—and if they don’t turn up, they will lose their benefits’;235 for older 
workers: ‘The long term unemployed are no longer going to get something for 
nothing. They’ll have to put back into their community, including compulsory 
work’.236 
Concluding comments 
From the 1970s, the West’s bourgeoisie, witnessing falling profits and 
diminishing class power, engineered an atavistic reversion to the essential 
mechanism of national capitalist class control: the expansion of the domestic reserve 
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labour army. Exploitation of this group has led to the creation of a servile, low-paid, 
service economy, significantly underpinned by workfare. Three broad ideological 
canopies have been deployed in justification of this project: necessity, social 
exclusion and Broken Britain. Beneath these umbrella deceits, a series of sub-lies 
emerged: that unemployment was essential, first to re-model the economy, and/or to 
control inflation; that workfare was required—first to provide training and control 
feral ‘youth’ and blacks, and then to attack the evil of ‘welfare dependence’ and the 
‘underclass’. In the 1990s, as the European Union shifted significantly towards a 
workfare paradigm, work became its own wages as ‘social inclusion’ replaced actual 
earnings for a new class of workfare helots. In the UK, neoliberal attack-dogs 
savaged the poor, and by the late 2000s the idea of ‘Broken Britain’ had emerged, 
deployed against the victims of poverty with ghastly and naked class-racism. The 
anger, the bile, the disgust of the neoliberal regime and its apologists is, however, 
too easily dismissed as ignorance, or mere chauvinism. It is, rather, the rage of the 
lion at the antelope: the despising of the people upon whose misery the elite feed to 
support their own wealth and privilege. Claims of supporting the long-term 
unemployed, the family, industriousness, wayward youth, British culture, law and 
order and the work ethic are primarily ideological reflections of a material, systemic 
impulse towards the super-exploitation of women, single parents, young people, 
paupers and immigrants amidst a miasma of poverty and disciplinary control 
engulfing the UK. Workfare has been a major engine driving the growth of this 
miasma—as similar schemes have also been in all earlier iterations of British 
capitalism. With the shifting of significant tax revenues from one group of working 
people to support the low wages of another, this overall project can be described as 
transforming Britain in to a workfare-dependent economy. 
In 2014, numbers of in-work housing benefits claimants rose 59% to 936,964, 
from 586,181 in 2010.237 The government’s ambition to harmonise in-work benefits 
with workfare has already been signalled, with welfare minister Lord Freud stating 
in 2012 that ‘obviously, we are interested in […] extending conditionality to 
claimants who are in relatively substantive levels of work but who are nevertheless 
capable of working more. A conditionality regime can play an important role in 
encouraging such claimants to progress towards more self-sufficiency’.238 The 
paradox of an unremitting expansion of the seemingly failing workfare regime is 
only solved when these events are viewed via the Marxist socio-economic lens: a 
disciplined and super-exploited workforce, and a growing reserve labour army, are 
the raw dinner-meat of the well-fed lions of the neoliberal jungle. Continued poverty 
and exploitation is, for the bourgeoisie, a tremendous success. 
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